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Abstract: Amidst rapid urban development, sustainable transportation solutions are required to 
meet the increasing demands for mobility whilst mitigating the potentially negative social, 
economic, and environmental impacts. This study analyses autonomous vehicles (AVs) as a 
potential transportation solution for smart and sustainable development. We identified privacy 
and cybersecurity risks of AVs as crucial to the development of smart and sustainable cities and 
examined the steps taken by governments around the world to address these risks. We highlight 
the literature that supports why AVs are essential for smart and sustainable development. We 
then identify the aspects of privacy and cybersecurity in AVs that are important for smart and 
sustainable development. Lastly, we review the efforts taken by federal governments in the US, 
the UK, China, Australia, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, Germany, France, and the EU, and by US 
state governments to address AV-related privacy and cybersecurity risks in-depth. Overall, the 
actions taken by governments to address privacy risks are mainly in the form of regulations or 
voluntary guidelines. To address cybersecurity risks, governments have mostly resorted to 
regulations that are not specific to AVs and are conducting research and fostering research 
collaborations with the private sector. 
Keywords: autonomous vehicles; automated driving; smart cities; sustainable development; risk; 
privacy; cybersecurity 
 
1. Introduction 
To make cities inclusive, safe, resilient, and sustainable is one of the goals set out by the United 
Nations (UN) in their 2030 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Cities are now home to over 
half the world’s population, and by 2050 it is expected that cities will account for two-thirds of the 
world’s population [1]. As cities grow rapidly, so does the demand for mobility and its attendant 
pressures on the economy, social stability, and the environment. Traffic congestion cost the US 
economy $124 billion in 2013, projected to increase to $186 billion by 2030 [2]. Other growing 
problems that the transportation industry contributes to are air pollution, climate change, negative 
effects on public health, and unequal access to services [3]. ‘Smart’ and ‘sustainable’ cities can help 
to alleviate these problems by utilising technological innovation to help individuals, businesses, 
and governments attain higher living standards while ensuring the sustainability of social and 
environmental systems [4]. Sustainable transport systems and infrastructure can reduce the 
negative impacts of urban development on the environment, economy, and society [5]. 
Autonomous vehicles (AVs) have emerged as a potential solution to modern day transport 
problems. Widespread AV adoption can reduce environmental degradation through reduced 
emissions and energy consumption while providing beneficial economic and social outcomes 
through improved efficiency, traffic flow, road safety, and accessibility to transport, among other 
benefits [6–9]. Much of these benefits stem from AVs’ connected nature, which enables them to 
communicate with other vehicles and critical infrastructure to optimise traffic and maximise all 
associated benefits for sustainable and smart cities [10,11]. 
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Since the introduction of AVs in 2010, their development and appeal has increased 
significantly. However, the successful operation of AVs and their impact on society depend 
significantly on their management and on addressing risks associated with them. Two of these risks 
are privacy and cybersecurity. Firstly, the ability of AVs to store and communicate personal data 
may conflict with data privacy laws, creating ambiguity regarding the ownership, storage, and 
transmission of data collected in the AV [12]. Secondly, AVs face major cybersecurity risks if the 
communication networks, which are crucial for their safe operation, are not secure from hacking. 
Unauthorised access to these networks can have dire consequences, such as undermining a 
vehicle’s safety and utilising personal data for malicious intent [7]. With increasing emphasis on 
“safe, secure, and affordable access to global networks” as a key criterion for social and economic 
progress, ensuring cybersecurity and privacy while “expanding Internet access and instilling 
human rights” is vital for sustainable development [13]. Other risks include safety risks, liability 
risks, and employment risks [14–16]. 
In this study, we focus on privacy and cybersecurity risks of AVs, which can potentially hinder 
the progress towards greater sustainability if they are not addressed appropriately by governments. 
Scholars have provided recommendations to address AV-related privacy and cybersecurity risks 
[17–21], but only a limited number of studies have explored the link between privacy and 
cybersecurity risks of AVs, and smart and sustainable development. Furthermore, there is a 
growing but limited literature that provides country-specific analysis regarding the governance 
responses to AVs. This article aims to address the following questions: (a) Why are AVs important 
for sustainability? (b) What are the privacy and cybersecurity risks associated with AVs? (c) What 
are the implications of these risks for sustainability? (d) What are the emerging solutions to address 
these risks? 
The next section provides an overview of the literature on smart and sustainable cities, as well 
as background information about AVs. In Section 3, we discuss why AVs are important to achieve 
smart and sustainable development. We then explore the implications of privacy and cybersecurity 
of AVs on smart and sustainable cities and examine the governance responses to manage them in 
Sections 4 and 5, before concluding. 
2. Background Information 
2.1. Sustainable and Smart Cities 
The idea of a ‘sustainable city’ first originated as a reference to “development that meets the 
needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own 
needs” [22]. A city is said to be sustainable if it can realise a higher standard of living while 
retaining “a self-sufficient economic, social, and environmental system” [4]. Sustainability is not a 
goal, but “a process of continuous improvement according to the needs and the context, which can 
vary in time and space” [5]. The term gained popularity in the 1990s and is widely understood by 
reference to the strong interrelationship between economic growth, environmental protection, and 
social equity, also known as the ‘triple bottom line’ [4,23]. While some scholars place greater 
emphasis on environmental aspects, others view sustainability from a socio-economic angle by 
emphasising the achievement of social equity [24,25]. However, advocates of the ‘triple bottom line’ 
often frame sustainability in broader terms, such that environmental considerations are in less 
conflict with social and economic sustainability [4]. 
The importance of building sustainable cities has received global attention as reflected in the 
UN’s 2030 SDGs, which aims to promote inclusive and sustainable economic growth, 
industrialisation, and innovation, to ensure good health and wellbeing for all ages, and to provide 
affordable and clean energy to meet business demands while protecting the environment [1]. More 
recently, the term ‘smart city’ has emerged as a new concept amidst the acceleration of competition 
among cities for businesses and talent, which has driven cities to place more emphasis on 
“economic feasibility and engineering systems solutions” to realise their desired objectives of urban 
development [4]. The first conception of a smart city emphasised the need to implement new and 
 4 of 24 
 
innovative technologies to solve problems in urban areas, and later emphasised a “greater degree of 
involvement of the local authorities” regarding the application of these technologies [26]. These 
smart technologies are implemented in the cities’ infrastructure, as well as in the cities’ governance 
and education systems, to improve interaction between citizens and their government [23]. In the 
latest concept of smart cities, Smart City 3.0, scholars advocate for citizens’ active usage of smart 
solutions to improve living standards and sustainability [23,26]. Caragliu et al. [27] identified six 
main characteristics of smart cities: utilising networked infrastructure for socio-economic 
development; adopting business-led development; ensuring equitable growth; capitalising on 
human talent and creative industries; the need for social capital for adaptation and innovation; and 
environmental sustainability. 
Due to its emphasis on connectivity as the main source of growth, the ‘smart city’ tends to shift 
attention away from environmental considerations and more towards infrastructure and 
information use; bibliographic analysis of the literature has found that the use of the term ‘smart 
city’ has exponentially increased since 2009 and in 2012 even surpassed that of ‘sustainable city’ in 
academic literature, suggesting that this new concept is likely to be the main driver of urban 
sustainability [4]. 
2.2. Background to AVs 
AVs (also known as driverless vehicles) are able to make decisions independently of human 
interference, in the face of uncertainty, and are set to revolutionise the transport industry [16,28] 
(we use the terms AV and driverless vehicles interchangeably in this article). AVs rely on sensor 
data and artificial intelligence (AI) to interpret the data, to make decisions regarding vehicle 
operation, and to adapt to changing conditions [29,30]. The advantage of AVs stems from their 
ability to rapidly process information and to adapt to their environment much faster than a human, 
and exchange information through vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) and vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) 
communication technologies [29]. 
The independence from human judgement and superior awareness of road conditions make 
AVs appealing in terms of safety, as they are mostly associated with the elimination of human error 
that has been responsible for countless fatalities in the history of motor vehicle accidents. Over 
35,000 fatalities occur from traffic accidents in the US every year [31]; China experiences around 
260,000 road fatalities a year; Japan experiences around 4000; and globally there are over a million 
road fatalities every year [29,32]. Adopting driverless cars can potentially reduce, if not eliminate, 
the most significant cause of car accidents (human errors) [14]. Studies estimate that a significant 
number of crashes could be avoided as a result of autonomous braking [33]. AVs are also capable of 
avoiding collisions while complying with traffic rules if the latter are made precise and 
unambiguous [34,35]. 
Given the rapid developments in AV technology, established car manufacturers and software 
companies are competing to harness new opportunities in the car- and ride-sharing industry 
[30,36,37]. A challenge faced by most governments is balancing the desire to adopt AVs and 
addressing the risks they introduce. AVs can potentially introduce great societal and economic 
benefits through increasing safety and mobility, particularly for the disabled and elderly. In 
addition, it is claimed that they can potentially increase competitiveness, productivity, and fuel 
economy, as well as reducing congestion and pollution [38–40]. 
However, AVs involve different types of risks (for a more comprehensive study of the societal 
implications of AVs see [41]). In this paper, the focus is on privacy and cybersecurity risks 
introduced by AVs. Despite the elimination of driver error, risks may arise from a myriad of factors, 
such as system errors, cyber-attacks on safety systems, and less cautious behaviour of both 
passengers and pedestrians. Sophisticated data processing and storage abilities of AVs raise data 
privacy concerns. Connection to external networks, which is necessary for vehicle cooperation on 
roads, exacerbates privacy risks as data can be easily retrieved once a network is compromised. In 
addition, the responsibility for car accidents will shift from the occupants to manufacturers, as the 
autonomous system, not the human, is in control of the AV. Both manufacturers and software 
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providers face greater risk of lawsuits arising from accident compensation, which may deter 
innovation if liability laws fail to systematically apportion responsibility. 
The Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) defines five levels of vehicle automation: at levels 
1 and 2 (assisted automation and partial automation, respectively), the human driver performs the 
driving operations [42], while at levels 3 to 5, the automated driving system carries out all of the 
dynamic driving tasks. It is expected that the human driver can control the vehicle occasionally at 
level 3 (conditional automation). The distinction between levels 4 (high automation) and 5 (full 
automation) is that only at level 5, the vehicle is expected to be able to operate under all 
environmental conditions [41]. In our study, we use the SAE classification, which is the most widely 
adopted classification of AVs, and focus on fully autonomous AVs (SAE levels 4 to 5), as they entail 
a greater shift in the society. 
3. AVs and Sustainability 
AVs offer potentially transformative benefits that contribute to economic and social 
sustainability. Firstly, AVs can increase economic efficiency by increasing road capacity, improving 
traffic flow, and reducing congestion [41,43–46]. These benefits stem mostly from AVs’ connectivity 
to external communication networks, known as V2V and V2I communication networks [28], which 
enable them to manage and distribute data on the go [30,47]. This enables platooning, which 
increases spatial efficiency, road capacity, and congestion [48]. Simulation studies have shown that 
the positive effects on congestion increase as the platoon length and cooperation between AVs 
increase [41,49]. The economic benefits are significant, considering the high costs of congestion, 
which amount to over $120 billion and £30 billion a year in the US and UK, respectively [29,50]. On 
the other hand, it is unclear when and whether these benefits will emerge, as the opposite may 
occur if AVs increase overall traffic demand, if AV penetration rates are low, or if road capacity 
does not increase as expected [51,52]. In addition, AVs may lead to a decrease in road accidents due 
to the absence of human error, which will also improve traffic flow [48]. Congestion can be further 
improved with upgrades to existing infrastructure to complement AVs, such as intelligent traffic 
lights that respond to instantaneous demand on roads and developing automated crossings that do 
not need traffic lights to operate [30,46]. Due to AVs’ connected nature, the locations of repair slots 
are easily communicated to AVs to optimise and centralise maintenance [30], yielding time savings. 
AVs can provide ride-sharing services to yield greater economic and social benefits. The 
‘sharing economy’ [48,53,54] enables the reallocation of underutilised resources for more productive 
uses, unlocking new sources of supply at a lower cost [53]. With AV technology, manufacturers 
may provide driverless car services by selling AV hours rather than the AV itself [53], also known 
as ‘shared’ AVs [18]. It is suggested that shared AVs are likely to be more efficient than existing 
ride-sharing services, such as Uber, Grab and Lyft [18,48]. Hörl et al. [30] note that fleet operators 
can buy AV hours optimised for “dense downtown situations or rural areas”, tailoring transport 
solutions that are unique to the community. In addition, using AVs frees up time, allowing 
passengers to complete work in the vehicle online, rather than at a centralised office all the time 
[30]. AVs can also significantly increase productivity in labour-intensive transportation industries 
and related occupations by reducing labour costs, although employment concerns may arise in the 
short-term, e.g., the freight industry [30], food distribution industry [55], and traffic policing [56]. 
Secondly, AVs can allow for more inclusive economic growth through greater accessibility to 
transport. AVs open up accessibility to new user groups who were previously unable to drive, such 
as the elderly and handicapped, which makes it possible to achieve a more inclusive society 
[30,57,58]. Furthermore, shared AV services can solve the first- and last-mile issue and increase 
spatial availability as they are able to drive to users autonomously [30,59]. It must be noted, 
however, that the registration of such shared mobility services relies on existing user access to 
digital platforms, which could be an additional barrier to mobility for those disadvantaged by the 
“digital gap or lack of access to banking” [3]. Greater accessibility may also worsen congestion 
through induced demand [48,59]. In addition, shared AVs may operate under a more profit-driven 
business model that seeks to develop its customer base while side-lining other more sustainable but 
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less profitable means of transport, such as walking or cycling [3]. In the case of individual 
ownership, AVs could be programmed to “cruise around the block while waiting for the owner to 
finish their business”, which would contribute to congestion [53]. It is suggested that this problem 
can be solved if AVs join other transportation services, such as taxis, ride-sharing pool systems, and 
small buses, to create “local links” in the transportation network; However, AVs risk cluttering up 
the areas around transit stations, where “walkability is the core feature sought by local 
governments, business investors, and communities” [59]. Hence, there is also a need to balance the 
benefits of greater accessibility with the negative aggregate effects arising from more unsustainable 
individual practices that shared mobility services may encourage [3]. 
Thirdly, AVs can have a potentially beneficial impact on public health and wellbeing. van 
Schalkwyk and Mindell [60] summarised the impacts of different transport modes on health. For 
instance, mental health is significantly affected by the lack of accessibility to transport modes and 
noise pollution stemming from excessive car usage, and poor transport planning may have a 
detrimental effect on the safety of residents, exacerbate urban sprawl, and disadvantage those with 
disabilities, whereas transport modes that encourage greater physical activity can reduce the risks 
of stress, depression, and various diseases [56,60]. AVs, by increasing accessibility, independence, 
and road safety, can have a beneficial impact on public health, especially for the elderly as AVs can 
help the elderly overcome physiological barriers to mobility and reduce the risk of collision for 
ageing drivers [56]. In addition, AVs can potentially reduce non-communicable diseases by 
reducing driving-induced stress, which is “a key contributor to hypertension” [56]. However, it is 
unclear whether these benefits will be offset by some unintended consequences AVs may have on 
public health. For instance, AVs may lead to continued decreases in physical activity, which can 
result in increases in obesity and consequently other diseases if individuals increase the usage of 
AVs at the expense of active modes of transport or other physical activity throughout the day [56], 
worsening the effects of a sedentary lifestyle. Public authorities may capitalise on the connectivity 
of AVs to increase public finances and improve social welfare, such as monitoring travel to impose 
taxes and to construct a socially-optimal traffic environment [30,61]. 
In addition to the economic and social benefits, AVs can potentially reduce the negative 
environmental impact of the transportation industry and thereby contribute to environmental 
sustainability. Studies have shown that AVs can reduce carbon emissions and improve fuel 
economy [41,62–64]. In addition, AVs’ ability to communicate and coordinate with other vehicles 
reduces traffic congestion and idling, thereby reducing unnecessary acceleration and braking 
[41,65]. Platooning also improves aerodynamics, reducing fuel consumption and emissions 
[19,66,67]. Currently, it is uncertain whether these positive effects on the environment will be offset 
by other unintended consequences. The US Department of Energy [68] has estimated that fuel 
usage and related emissions could either decrease by 60% or increase three times [69]. The latter 
may be the case if the induced vehicle demand from AVs contributes to higher emissions levels 
[67,70,71]. In addition, improved fuel efficiency depends on other factors, such as the design of 
control algorithms that account for fuel efficiency, and the penetration rate of AVs [72,73]. Milakis 
et al.’s [41] literature review on the impacts of AVs suggests that in the short-term AVs can improve 
fuel savings and reduce emissions, but their long-term effects are ambiguous. Li et al. [64] highlight 
that emissions and energy consumption may be reduced only if V2I technologies are applied 
correctly to manage traffic flow at intersections. Others, such as Newman et al. [59], argue for a 
more sceptical perspective regarding AVs’ overall impact on sustainability and show that AVs still 
cannot compete with individual mobility due to the greater independence/freedom of the latter, 
and cannot compete with transit-based mobility, due to higher vehicle occupancy/capacity of the 
latter. 
4. AV Privacy 
4.1. AV Privacy Implications for Smart and Sustainable Cities 
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AVs are one of many smart devices that can store highly sensitive data through video and 
audio recording [21,74], and that can also transmit such data to other vehicles, connected 
infrastructure, and third-party organisations through external V2V and V2I communication 
networks. While it is recognised that such data sharing is essential for efficient traffic management 
[12] and the accurate assignment of liability in the event of collisions [75], unrestricted sharing of 
data raises privacy concerns. 
Informational privacy of AVs is important in order to reap the full benefits of increased 
connectivity in an information society [76], and thus to develop smarter and more sustainable cities. 
Informational privacy (or data privacy) is defined as “the protection of a person and his/her 
behaviour” such that the individual is “able to control the risks for his or her rights to privacy, 
freedom, or equality caused by the processing of data related to him or her” [77]. Currently, it is 
unclear who can access and use the data collected in AVs [28]. Firstly, informational privacy in AVs 
is important to safeguard against the misuse of personal information that can inflate societal 
discrimination, which is crucial for sustainability from the perspective of social stability. As there 
are “no explicit rules to consider certain data special and have special hindrances for their usage”, 
the data collected in AVs may be misused in many ways that disadvantage AV passengers [78]. For 
instance, insurance companies and credit rating agencies can use AV data to calculate insurance 
premiums and credit scores associated with individuals, which have been shown to be very 
inaccurate [78]. In general, highly sensitive personal information, such as geographical locations, 
may be used to make unfair inferences about individuals in systems that use AI such as AVs, 
especially if existing datasets are biased against people of certain ethnicities or sexualities, and 
consequently exacerbate existing inequalities in society [79,80]. Scholars have highlighted other 
examples of data misuse that could be detrimental to AV users. For instance, past travel in AVs can 
be used to predict the behaviour of AV users and to harass them through tailored advertising and 
marketing strategies [12,17]. An important implication is the increasing power disparity between 
the organisations that control such data and individuals in society [17]. In particular, humans leave 
behind unique signatures in data relating to their geographical location, which can be used for 
re-identification with the aid of a small amount of side-information (side information is defined as 
the information an adversary acquires from indirect sources such as social networks, news articles, 
and chat logs to infer a target’s location through a set of anonymous traces [81]) [12,81,82]. 
Nevertheless, Fagnant and Kockelman [83] highlight the importance of balancing privacy concerns 
against the considerable social and economic benefits from data sharing, such as improving 
transport planning and investment decisions. 
Furthermore, informational privacy in AVs is crucial to building consumer trust, which is 
crucial for economic sustainability. This is especially so in the sharing economy, where consumers 
act as “prosumers” who are “offering mobility services themselves” [54,77]. Only where there is 
consumer trust can there be sufficient market uptake of AVs, which is crucial if further 
improvements are to be made to the technology in terms of safety, efficiency, traffic flow, and other 
benefits to achieve a smarter and more sustainable society [77]. To manage informational privacy 
and to build consumer trust in AVs, scholars have recommended increasing transparency regarding 
what data is being collected, who is using it, how the data is being used and shared, in-depth 
disclosures about potential security vulnerabilities, providing opt out options, and limiting data 
collection to the minimal amount required [21,77]. 
Another realm of privacy that has wide implications for society is surveillance, whereby 
people can be tracked constantly while they travel [17]. Such a situation is less likely to arise when 
individuals privately own AVs. However, in the case where AVs are used as a transportation 
service, public and private agencies will have access to AVs’ communication networks. In an 
extreme scenario, AVs may be used as platforms for widespread surveillance through the use of 
location tracking, and audio/visual recording of passengers [21]. The idea of widespread 
surveillance has emerged in China, whose government in 2014 announced plans to launch what 
they call a ‘Social Credit System’ by 2020 to rate citizens’ financial creditworthiness, and social and 
political behaviour [84,85]. In this way, the Chinese government aims to restore lost confidence in 
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public institutions by cracking down on corrupt officials and “keep[ing] track of the changing views 
and interests of China’s population” [84]. 
However, there are concerns that this will undermine individual freedom and democratic 
processes [12,78,84]. Rannenberg [78] argues that recording personally identifiable data about AV 
users’ geographical locations and destinations, such as participation in an interest group or 
travelling to a political meeting, could reduce citizens’ participation in democratic processes as 
citizens may assume that such recording could “expose them to risks” and have detrimental 
impacts on social wellbeing [17]. In a more extreme scenario, Boeglin [86] highlights that using AVs 
for widespread surveillance has a similar effect as that in a Panopticon, in which individual 
autonomy is severely restricted due to the “fear of being seen”. Thus, AVs’ facilitation of 
widespread surveillance could potentially create a less equitable society, cause greater social unrest, 
and impede the development of smart governance, whereby citizens have access to and actively 
utilise information to influence policy-making, which is an important aspect of smart cities as 
highlighted by De Jong et al. [4] and Caragliu et al. [27]. 
Thus, having proper governance frameworks to manage the risks to privacy is essential to 
promote the continued usage of connected infrastructure and information and communication 
technology (ICT) for socio-economic development, which underscores the advocated model of 
development for a smart city that requires connectivity by various scholars [4,26,27]. In the next 
section, we analyse the responses of various governments to managing these privacy risks. 
4.2. Strategies Adopted to Address AV Privacy Risks 
Most governments have begun enacting legislation to manage privacy risks that are not 
specific to AVs, whereas others, such as Australia, acknowledge the need to address these risks and 
have begun exploring regulatory options for doing so. The UK and Germany have introduced 
non-mandatory privacy guidelines that AV manufacturers can follow. An analysis of US states 
shows that most states have begun introducing and enacting legislation to control AV-specific 
privacy risks. 
The EU has been one of the first entities to focus on privacy and cybersecurity risks. In April 
2009 the European Parliament recognised the need to ensure privacy in Intelligent Transport 
Systems (ITS) from their early stages of the design process, and emphasised the urgency of 
involving all of the stakeholders in designing these systems [87]. Following a study in October 2012 
on how data privacy can be ensured in ITS [88], all EU member states mutually committed to 
addressing data and cybersecurity issues through the Declaration of Amsterdam on 14 April 2016 
[89]. On the same day, the EU followed through on its commitment by successfully ratifying the EU 
General Data Protection Regulation (EU GDPR), which will take effect in May 2018. The EU GDPR 
makes significant changes to the Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC of 1995. The regulations even 
transcend the geographical boundaries of the EU, applying to all companies regardless of their 
location as long as they process data from people residing in the EU [90]. In the EU GDPR 
conditions for customers’ consent have been strengthened and penalties for violations are more 
stringent than before as fines are now increased and can be up to 4% of companies’ global revenue 
[90]. Other aspects of the regulations restrict the use of personal data to avoid any potential 
violation of privacy. However, if these rules are implemented excessively, privacy risks may be 
avoided at the expense of the benefits of data sharing. This is especially so as AVs rely on a large 
amount of geo-coded data to navigate optimally [29]. Scholars have highlighted the need to balance 
privacy concerns with “the utility of the generated information” in accelerating the future 
improvements to AVs [12], as excessive regulation of the commercial use of such data could 
undermine the competitive advantage of European vehicle manufacturers [29]. 
China and Japan have similarly addressed personal data privacy and cybersecurity risks by 
amending existing legislations. China’s new cybersecurity law was enacted in November 2016 and 
took effect in June 2017. The law requires the anonymisation of all forms of personal information 
and emphasises on customer consent and transparency from network operators about the purpose, 
technique, and scope of all data collection and usage. Network operators are also not allowed to 
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“disclose, alter, or destroy collected personal information” unless the person from whom the 
information was gathered consents, and a person is entitled to request the deletion of their 
information in the event of illegal or unauthorised collection or use [91]. All the restrictions outlined 
by the law are not specific to AVs and applies to all data in general. Japan also updated its Privacy 
Protection Law in December 2016, which took effect in May 2017. The updated law requires 
organisations to obtain individual consent before using or sharing personal data with third parties, 
and to notify the public about the reasons for such data usage or data sharing as well as requiring 
organisations to follow rules set forth by the Personal Information Protection Commission (PIPC) to 
ensure that it is “impossible to identify a specific individual and restore the personal information” 
from the anonymous information, and to disclose to the public which “categories of information 
relating to an individual” are contained in the anonymous information [92]. Scenarios where these 
requirements do not apply include if the disclosure of the use of data can potentially harm “a 
principal or third-party’s life, body, fortune or other rights and interests” or the data handling 
organisation’s “rights or legitimate interests”; however, it requires organisations to keep records of 
data transfers to third parties—something the PIPC will provide guidelines on in future [92]. 
In Singapore, the government is in the process of strengthening regulations on privacy that 
apply to all personal data. In July 2017, the Personal Data Protection Commission (PDPC) proposed 
modifications to the Personal Data Protection Act (PDPA) and consulted a range of stakeholders. 
Key changes that the PDPC has decided to implement include notifying individuals of the purpose 
behind the collection, use and disclosure of personal data, allowing individuals to opt out from the 
collection or use of personal data within a “reasonable time period”, and requiring organisations to 
conduct “risk and impact” assessments to ensure that the usage of data is unlikely to negatively 
impact individuals [93]. Similar to Japan’s amended Privacy Protection Law, Singapore’s PDPC also 
intends to make an exception to these rules if the data is being used to protect “legitimate interests” 
that have “economic, social, security or other benefits for the public”, while still requiring full 
disclosure of the reasons for adopting this exception and is planning to release guidelines to clarify 
the definition of “adverse impact” and “legitimate interests”, as well as situations where opt outs 
are not required [93]. The Singapore government has also introduced a new law in November 2017 
that regulates data sharing specifically between public sector agencies. The Public Sector 
(Governance) Bill establishes a new data sharing framework, which imposes criminal penalties for 
unauthorised data sharing between public agencies, and unauthorised re-identification of 
anonymised data [94,95]. The Bill seeks to improve the “efficiency or effectiveness of policies, 
programme management or service planning and delivery by Singapore public sector agencies” 
and to support a “whole-of-government approach” to delivering public services [95] and strengthen 
the security of sensitive information, such as identifiable data, through storage in databases 
additional protection measure and limited access [94]. Similar to the EU, China and Japan, the 
Public Sector (Governance) Bill establishes specific boundaries around the sharing and use of data 
by public sector agencies, which might alleviate concerns around the use of data for surveillance. 
Furthermore, it lists the penalties that will be applied in a variety of scenarios where data protection 
is violated. For instance, it imposes a fine of S$5000 or imprisonment of up to two years if a public 
sector official attempts to re-identify anonymised data without authorisation [95]. 
The South Korean and US governments have taken legislative actions to address the data 
privacy risks applicable to all vehicles. In 2017, the US introduced the SPY Car Act, which regulates 
access to and use of data stored in all vehicles manufactured for sale in the US [96]. Firstly, the law 
mandates that owners or lessees must be clearly informed regarding the “collection, transmission, 
retention, and use” of the data collected from the vehicle. Secondly, the law mandates certain 
provisions to ensure consumer control over privacy. For instance, users of the vehicles must be able 
to terminate the collection and retention of data in the vehicle, and in the event of doing so, they 
should still have access to all features and services provided by the vehicle. Thirdly, the law 
attempts to limit the misuse of personal data for commercial purposes by explicitly stating that 
unless vehicle users have given their consent, manufacturers are not allowed to use such data for 
marketing and advertising purposes. Similarly, in 2016 South Korea updated its Vehicle 
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Management Act and established provisions for AV testing, as well as data collection involving all 
vehicles; the Minister of Land, Infrastructure and Transport must grant permission before any 
individual can use collected data. The Act focuses on the avoidance of privacy violations in respect 
of vehicle owners and demands the approval and determination by the Ministry, without 
specifying the level of information sharing that is permitted [97,98]. 
The governments in Germany, France and Australia have acknowledged the importance of 
AV-related privacy concerns but have yet to take legislative action to manage these risks. The 
German government’s AV legislation that was enacted in 2017 addresses mainly liability risks but 
does not address privacy risks [99]. For instance, the law requires a black box (to record the AV 
journey) for apportioning liability during accidents, but it does not clarify the ownership and 
sharing of the data collected in the black box. However, the intention is to revise the bill in two 
years to incorporate AV data use and protections into the law [99]. The government in France has 
not amended legislation relating to privacy in general but intends to revise regulations for AVs by 
2019 to legalise the testing of level-four AVs on public roads in France [100]. In addition, the 
government intends to allow for greater data sharing to help French companies and researchers 
further develop AI including AVs while committing to incorporate privacy concerns in a manner 
consistent with the EU’s GDPR [100]. 
Australia has also released non-mandatory privacy recommendations and, in addition, has 
consulted different stakeholders to further explore the implications of privacy and ways in which 
privacy risks can be addressed. The National Transport Commission (NTC) has advocated a 
“privacy by design” approach to AVs and the incorporation of privacy protection at the highest 
level, focusing on not generating personal information in the first place [101]. Another consultation 
was issued by the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Industry, Innovation, Science 
and Resources (HRSCIISR) to explore the social implications of AVs. The HRSCIISR reported the 
need to further examine data rights for a range of stakeholder groups and recommended 
establishing a national body, together with state and territory jurisdictions, and in collaboration 
with AV manufacturers and technology providers, to coordinate the introduction of AVs into the 
marketplace [102]. Australia currently relies on existing privacy laws, the Privacy Act 1988, and the 
Australian Privacy Principles, to regulate manufacturers and technology providers. The NTC 
perceives these existing provisions to be sufficient in the short run, explicitly stating that “no 
changes are recommended at this time to privacy laws governing automated vehicles and the 
transmission of personal information (including location data)” and plans on developing options 
for sufficiently protecting privacy for AV users, and regulating government access to AV data by 
late 2018 [101]. The NTC recognises that current restrictions to government access to data specified 
in the Privacy Act 1988 are not very strong as the Australian Privacy Principles are based on a 
consent model while consumers are often unaware of how and what data is collected and used 
[101]. 
In the UK, the Department for Transport (DfT) and the Centre for the Protection of National 
Infrastructure (CPNI) collaborated and released eight key principles for privacy and cybersecurity 
in AVs in August 2017. These principles are also non-mandatory and serve as guidelines that AV 
manufacturers and other parties in the supply chain should follow. The principles recommend that 
manufacturers follow the ISO 27018 and ISO 29101, which outline best practices in relation to 
protecting personally identifiable information (PII) in public clouds, and provide a Privacy 
Architecture framework, respectively [103]. While most of the principles emphasise the 
cybersecurity of the AV systems, privacy considerations are included in some aspects. For instance, 
they recommend “minimising shared data storage” and briefly state that PII must be “managed 
appropriately” in terms of data storage, transmission, and usage, as well as data ownership [103]. In 
addition, they recommend that users should have the option to delete “sensitive data” collected in 
AV systems. These privacy principles are similar to the EU GDPR and the SPY Car Act in the US. 
However, they do not specify the scenarios in which PII collection and usage is prohibited or 
permitted. For instance, how PII should be “managed appropriately” and “sensitive data” is not 
defined. Overall, the guidelines indicate the UK government’s awareness of privacy risks relating to 
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AVs, but they have not made these guidelines mandatory. A possible reason for this is the goal of 
making the UK a leader for AV R&D [104], and thus the government is careful not to inhibit the 
growth of the technology. The German government has also pursued a similar approach to the UK 
and 13 recommendations for AVs have been released that mainly address safety risks, but also 
include recommendations for greater clarification regarding “which data businesses can process 
without the ‘explicit consent’ of vehicle users” [105]. 
At the state level in the US, most surveyed state governments have so far amended or 
introduced legislation to tackle AV-related privacy risks. A common requirement in state legislation 
is for AV testers to make full disclosure to passengers regarding what personal information is 
collected, and how it is collected and used. California was the first to impose this requirement, in 
2012 [106]. In late 2015, California’s Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) released draft 
requirements for manufacturers to disclose to the operator if information beyond what is necessary 
for safety is collected from the AV, and manufacturers are required to obtain approval before 
collecting this information [107]. These draft requirements have since become part of new, 
permanent legislation and manufacturers must fully disclose the collection of any information that 
is not necessary for ensuring the safety of the driver, and the information must be anonymised 
[108]. Other states following suit are Georgia [109], Massachusetts [110], Michigan [111], and 
Tennessee [112]. Since 2016, these states have introduced the Safe Autonomous Vehicles (SAVE) 
project, which allows eligible motor vehicle manufacturers to deploy a network of on-demand AVs. 
Any individual participating in the SAVE project is deemed to consent to data collection before and 
during the project, and manufacturers must also release a privacy statement to the public disclosing 
its data handling practices related to the AV fleet [109–112]. In March 2017, Texas introduced a bill 
to manage privacy risks from AVs offering transportation services [113], specifying similar 
disclosure requirements to those of Georgia, Michigan, Massachusetts, and Tennessee regarding the 
SAVE project. However, the bill failed to pass. In April 2017, Tennessee updated its data breach 
notification law, which revised definitions of a “breach of system security” and “personal 
information” to include the specification that such a breach “materially compromises the security, 
confidentiality, or integrity of personal information” of the information holder [114]. 
Massachusetts has taken a broader approach by introducing a new bill on January 2017 to 
regulate the data collected by Internet of things (IoT) devices, which includes AVs [115]. These 
regulations explicitly apply to anyone who owns or licenses personal information, collects personal 
data, or manufactures any AV that uses or installs an IoT device in the vehicle that collects personal 
data. The aim is to ensure the confidentiality and security of the customer information “in a manner 
fully consistent with industry standards”, to guard against “anticipated threats or hazards to the 
security or integrity of such information” and “against unauthorised access to or use of such 
information that may result in substantial harm or inconvenience to any consumer” [115]. Another 
bill proposed in January 2017 instructs the Massachusetts Department of Transportation and the 
Registrar of motor vehicles to create rules for the testing, deployment, sale, and leasing of AVs 
[116]. The public can openly access data collected from AVs, but subject to safeguards as deemed 
necessary by the Registrar for privacy protection and the bill limits the storage of safety data to a 
maximum of 18 months which may represent an attempt to limit the potential for data misuse. 
Pennsylvania has not enacted new legislation regarding data privacy but has made 
recommendations regarding data collection and usage. Pennsylvania Department of Transportation 
(PennDOT) released draft rules in 2016 that require all AV testers to provide information collected 
in the vehicle to the department [117]. With some exceptions, the department declared its 
commitment to non-disclosure of confidential information and in fact defined the term (PennDOT 
defines confidential information as “knowledge, information, data, compilations of data, customer-
identifying information, reports, and documents that are confidential, trade secrets of, and 
proprietary to the Tester (i.e., information not in the public domain) including, but not limited to, 
information about and on the Tester’s products, customers, and business operations and strategy” 
[117]), ensuring that exempted third parties will keep the data confidential. PennDOT has not, 
however, specified the steps it will take to ensure the confidentiality of such data by third parties. 
 12 of 24 
 
For safety reasons, manufacturers and AV testers are permitted to collect data on the total number of 
miles travelled by, or hours of operation of, AVs, the extent of AV fleet testing, and the number of 
reportable crashes where the AV is deemed to be at fault as well as other types of data such as the 
number of new jobs created in Pennsylvania due to AV testing [117]. 
5. AV Cybersecurity 
5.1. AV Cybersecurity Implications for Smart and Sustainable Cities 
The cybersecurity of AVs is essential for smart and sustainable development. The term 
“security” in cybersecurity is often defined as the protection of the integrity, confidentiality, and 
accessibility of information [77,118]. Von Solms and van Niekerk [119] highlight that the 
requirements of cybersecurity extend beyond this definition, which fits more closely to that of 
informational security which seeks to protect the underlying ICT infrastructure, and information 
that is both directly and indirectly stored and transmitted by the technology [119]. However, in the 
case of cybersecurity, all assets (both information-based and non-information-based) need to be 
protected to secure not just the cyberspace, but also “those that function in cyberspace, whether 
individuals, organisations or nations” as the non-information-based assets such as the personal and 
physical aspects of human beings, societal values, and national infrastructure also need to be 
protected [119]. For this reason, cybersecurity concerns encompass both privacy and safety [76,77]. 
Firstly, the cybersecurity of AVs is essential for safety and social stability, one of the key 
criterions for a sustainable city. The vulnerabilities facing cybersecurity in general stem from the 
use of ICTs and their interaction with cyberspace [119]. Given that AVs require external 
communication networks to operate safely on roads, there is a risk of third parties hacking these 
wireless networks and undermining safety-critical functions of the AV systems [10,29,120]. Scholars 
have highlighted various ways in which AVs can be hacked and their negative implications, such as 
hacking the AVs’ wireless Event Data Recorder system [12], jamming the AVs’ GPS signal for the 
purposes of theft [11,121], modifying the AVs’ sensors and maps to distort perceptions, and 
conducting Denial of Service (DoS) attacks to prevent receiving critical information [10,11,121,122]. 
Yag ̆dereli et al. [122] highlight the security weaknesses of the controller area network protocol that 
interconnects a broad range of functionalities in modern vehicles, such as its vulnerability to 
malicious content in any one component in the network. Given AVs’ ability to store a variety of 
private information, such as credit card usage and medical records [120], hackers have great 
incentives to obtain this information to commit crimes. The cybersecurity of AVs also has wider 
societal implications beyond road safety as AVs form part of a nation’s critical infrastructure. Iacono 
and Marrone [123] highlight that attacks against critical infrastructure are increasing as cyber-physical 
systems, such as AVs, expose critical infrastructure systems to the Internet and its related cyber threats. 
This can compromise the integrity and availability of data and access to the critical services provided by 
the infrastructure, such as resulting in accidents and traffic disruptions, thereby affecting the society’s 
wellbeing as a whole [83,119]. 
Secondly, the cybersecurity of AVs is essential for economic sustainability as it enables the 
realisation of the gains from improved connectivity. Cyber-attacks, in general, are costly for 
businesses, and it is estimated that cyber-attacks will cost approximately $3 trillion in lost 
productivity by 2020; therefore, enhancing cybersecurity can help save on costs and build firms’ 
economic competitiveness in the longer-run [13]. Given the aforementioned implications of AVs’ 
cybersecurity for safety, cybersecurity is crucial to building trust in, and increasing public 
acceptance of, AVs [77]. In AVs, cyber-attacks violate the expected confidence in computer systems 
and thus erode user confidence in the technology. Numerous studies have provided 
recommendations on what kinds of robust security and privacy frameworks can be adopted to 
improve cybersecurity and to increase users’ trust in technology in general [13,124]. Promoting 
cybersecurity through the lens of corporate social responsibility can also allow firms to “distinguish 
themselves and add value”, which can improve business outcomes in the long run [13]. Unless AV 
developers establish sound cybersecurity practices for the technology, cyber-attacks resulting from 
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systematic weaknesses will cause a “critical setback to the connectivity efforts and progress made 
over the last years” [124]. Currently, the automotive industry standards lack sufficient coverage for 
the breadth of cybersecurity risks faced by AVs and scholars highlight the need for a “solid 
foundation of security, privacy, and trust to fully take advantage of innovations in connected and 
self-driving vehicles”, which would require the collaboration between a diverse group of 
stakeholders to ensure both the physical and cyber safety of AV users [77]. 
5.2. Strategies Adopted to Address AV Cybersecurity Risks 
The commonly adopted approaches to address cybersecurity risks include enacting legislation 
that are not specific to AVs, conducting further research into cybersecurity risks for AVs and all 
vehicles in general, and providing guidelines. Some governments such as that of the UK and 
Singapore have also begun educating the public of cybersecurity risks, whereas the governments of 
Japan and South Korea have yet to indicate their intentions to address cybersecurity risks. 
In the US, the federal government has taken steps to explore vehicle cybersecurity risks and 
has made recommendations to manage AV-specific cybersecurity risks. In 2012, the National 
Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) set up a new department to research the “safety, 
security, and reliability of complex, interconnected, electronic vehicle systems” and set up an 
Electronics Council to enhance collaboration across the entire NHTSA organisation regarding 
vehicle electronics and cybersecurity [125]. More recently, the NHTSA, released non-mandatory 
recommendations for AV development and in the Automated Driving Systems guidance, 
encouraged entities to design their AV systems according to standards established by relevant 
organisations, such as NHTSA, SAE, the Automotive Information Sharing and Analysis Centre 
(ISAC), and various auto-manufacturer associations [126]. Other recommendations include 
development of cyber incident response plans and vulnerability disclosure and reporting policies as 
well as publishing a Voluntary Safety Assessment letter to demonstrate that entities are following 
the recommended guidelines; However, surprisingly given the ample emphasis on developing 
plans, policies and guidelines, the NHTSA also explicitly states that to avoid delays in testing or 
deployment, submission of the Assessment Letter is “not required”, and there is no “mechanism to 
compel entities to do so” [126], which may stem from the fear of stifling AV developments. 
In the US, the recently introduced SPY Car Act addresses vehicle cybersecurity risks. The law 
contains provisions to guard against the hacking of vehicles, such as requiring penetration testing 
to evaluate vehicles’ resilience to hacking and separating critical and non-critical software systems 
in all vehicles, and it provides specifications for ensuring the security of the data collected in 
vehicles and during transmission from the vehicle, and of data stored outside the vehicle [96]. The 
SPY Car Act requires AVs to have the capability to detect, prevent, and report attempts at hijacking 
the control of vehicles, as well as capturing the stored data. 
At the state level, California, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania have introduced legislation to 
address cybersecurity threats to AVs. California’s DMV drafted rules in 2016 that require 
manufacturers to certify AVs’ ability to detect and react to cyber-attacks in accordance with the 
“appropriate and applicable” industry standards, which has since been approved as permanent 
regulation on February 2018 [108]. Massachusetts’ newly-introduced bill authorises the Department 
of Consumer Affairs and Business Regulation to implement regulations that are consistent with 
federal regulations to protect personal information and data collected by an IoT device, which 
includes AVs and other smart devices [115]. The delegation of additional responsibility to the 
Department is done to guard against unauthorised access or use and protect the integrity of the 
data. Another introduced bill assigns responsibility to the Massachusetts Department of 
Transportation to ensure that data collection systems are secure, tamper-resistant, and able to 
maintain the accuracy of the data collected [127]. Unlike California and Massachusetts, 
Pennsylvania’s new bill does not include specifications to ensure the security of data collection 
systems but makes non-mandatory recommendations for AV testers to provide proof that 
cybersecurity precautions are taken, and it imposes requirements for AV testers and PennDOT to 
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notify each other immediately in the event that a cybersecurity intrusion attempts to access 
connected infrastructure or the AV [117,128]. 
Georgia, Michigan, and Texas have enacted legislation that addresses cybersecurity risks to all 
systems in general, although these are not specific to AVs. Georgia recently passed a new bill that 
criminalises unauthorised access to computers or computer networks in the state [129]. In 2017, 
Texas authorised a new Cybersecurity Act that instructs the creation of a committee to research on 
cybersecurity issues and the “information security plans” of Texas’ state agencies [130]. In the same 
year, Michigan enacted a law that allocates funds for cybersecurity and instructs the Michigan DOT 
to “identify specific outcomes and performance measures” to improve cybersecurity, such as by 
reducing the daily incidence of cyber threats, and to raise awareness among citizens about cyber 
threats and the necessary preventive actions [131]. The government of Michigan also proposed 
creating a cybersecurity council to recommend cybersecurity improvements to state infrastructure 
and to identify ways to enhance the state’s cybersecurity industry [132]. 
The EU has adopted a variety of strategies to manage cybersecurity risks. In August 2016, the 
EU enacted the first EU-wide legislation on cybersecurity: “the Directive on the security of network 
and information systems” (NIS directive) [133]. In August 2014, the EU’s Data Protection Working 
Party highlighted the potential security risks of IoT [87] and in December 2016 the EU Agency for 
Network and Information Security released best practices guidelines for the cybersecurity of 
connected vehicles, including both conventional and AVs, to increase awareness of and provide 
guidance on these issues [134]. 
China has also taken steps to address the cybersecurity risks of all cyber systems. China’s new 
cybersecurity law takes effect in June 2017, outlining specific provisions to strengthen the protection 
of critical infrastructure and personal information, as well as establishing the responsibilities of 
network operators, regulating the sale of critical cybersecurity equipment, and outlining penalties 
for potential violations [135]. Network operators are required to follow security procedures to 
“safeguard networks from interference, destruction or unauthorised access” [136]. These stricter 
requirements will shape how foreign businesses handle data in China, as the Cyberspace 
Administration of China (CAC) also published “Measures for Security Assessment of Personal 
Information and Important Data Leaving the Country” earlier in April 2017, expanding the 
requirements for data localisation to all network operators which will impact AV manufacturers 
looking to test and deploy their products in China [91]. Many provisions of the law appear to be 
designed to protect national interests. For instance, the law emphasises on ensuring the security of 
data moving in and out of China [136], and consistently evaluates the security of critical 
information infrastructure that is vital for the public interest as well as the national economy and 
national security [135]. The law also requires sensitive information to be preserved in the country, 
although the government has yet to explicitly clarify what kinds of information they deem to be 
“sensitive” [136]. 
Singapore has adopted a diversified approach to managing cybersecurity risks by amending 
legislation, consulting different stakeholders, and educating the public about such risks. In April 
2017, the Singapore government amended the Computer Misuse and Cybersecurity (CMC) Act, 
which took effect in June 2017, making it illegal for individuals to use personal information 
“obtained illegally from a computer” and to obtain “hacking tools” to commit or facilitate crimes 
[137]. The government has taken steps to strengthen the response to such risks and minimise the 
costs associated with these risks. The PDPC issued a public consultation in July 2017 and proposed 
a “mandatory data breach notification regime” whereby organisations are required to notify 
affected individuals and the PDPC in the event of a data breach that is to cause significant impact 
on individuals to whom the breached information relates [93]. In addition, exceptions are made if 
the affected individuals are the subjects of an “ongoing or potential investigation under the law” 
and if the data being unauthorised for use or collection is encrypted [93]. Overall, the PDPC’s 
proposed changes aim to balance the need for using data with individuals’ rights to privacy 
protection. 
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On the other hand, the governments of Japan and South Korea have not provided any 
indication of their approach to managing cybersecurity risks in relation to AVs or cyber systems as 
a whole. In 2017, the Korean government amended the Motor Vehicle Management Act. However, 
the law does not include any provisions on cybersecurity. The law states that any person who 
“intends to use the data processed by electronic data processing systems” required for management 
of vehicles must obtain approval from the Minister of Land, Transport and Maritime Affairs [97], 
but it does not provide any information on, for instance, whether there are any restrictions on data 
access or any measures to prevent unauthorised access to such data. Similarly, Japan has not 
amended legislation or provided guidelines on addressing cybersecurity risks in general or those 
that are specific to AVs. 
While governments of Germany, France, Australia, and the UK have not amended or 
introduced any new legislation on cybersecurity, they have taken steps to increase awareness of 
AV-related cybersecurity risks. The German government has established working groups on 
AV-related issues in September 2015, which include cybersecurity and data protection as part of its 
national strategy for “Automated and Connected Driving” [138]. Likewise, the French government 
has set up working groups in 2016 to address AV-related societal issues, one of which involves 
security issues. As mentioned in the Privacy section, in Australia, the HRSCIISR has recommended 
coordination of the efforts of different stakeholders through creation of a national body [102].  
The UK’s approach to addressing cybersecurity risks seems to be targeted at increasing 
awareness, strengthening the nation’s longer-term resilience to cybersecurity risks and building the 
nation’s cybersecurity industry that includes focus on AVs [139]. The UK tech consortium, 5*StarS, 
secured funding from the government’s innovation agency, “Innovate UK”, in April 2017 to 
develop a methodology that the AV industry can use to ensure that AV systems meet the required 
cybersecurity standards throughout their life span [140]. The UK has also implemented the 
National Cybersecurity Strategy 2016–2021 that focuses on promoting research and strengthening 
UK’s position in this field by 2021. The government has also set up the National Cybersecurity 
Centre (NCSC) in October 2016 to provide guidance on addressing cybersecurity risks, as well as to 
aid in the implementation of the EU’s NIS directive [141]. As mentioned in the previous section, the 
UK DfT and CPNI have created a set of principles that are aimed at the AV manufacturing supply 
chain. Principles 2 and 5–8 relate to key aspects of AV manufacturing ranging from focusing on 
security in the design process and resilience and response to attacks (Principles 5 and 8), lifecycle 
management of AV software systems and management of risks in the supply chain (Principles 6 
and 2) to security in the storage and transmission of data (Principle 7) [103]. Figure 1 summarises the 
establishment of AV-related privacy and cybersecurity strategies by different governments discussed in 
Sections 4 and 5. 
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Figure 1. Timeline of AV-related privacy and cybersecurity strategies. 
6. Discussion and Conclusions 
Transportation has immense implications for social welfare, economic development, and 
environmental sustainability. Congestion, environmental degradation, social inequity, and public 
health issues are problems that sustainable transport policies urgently need to resolve. In this 
article, we explored AVs and their potential as a solution for smart and sustainable development. 
AVs offer potentially transformative benefits that can alleviate some of these concerns and lead the 
way to a greater level of sustainability. Due to AVs’ connected nature, data can be used to optimise 
traffic flows, reduce congestion, and yield significant economic benefits, as well as increase 
accessibility by new user groups. The increased accessibility can lower psychological barriers to 
mobility, and isolation, and thus improve public health and wellbeing. These economic and social 
benefits can be realised while ensuring the self-sufficiency of the environmental system, as it has 
been shown that AVs can reduce carbon emissions and fuel consumption. Studies point out that 
these benefits may present a trade-off with other unintended consequences. Greater accessibility to 
mobility may create induced demand that can worsen congestion, increase emissions, increase 
energy consumption, and cause a deterioration in public health if individuals increase AV usage at 
the expense of more active modes of transport, which will worsen the effects of a sedentary 
lifestyle. Furthermore, the benefits to congestion depend on many factors, such as the penetration 
rate of AVs and the increase in road capacity. 
As highlighted in this article, AV privacy has crucial implications for smart and sustainable 
development. Amidst the growth of ICTs and the sharing economy, the protection of personal data 
and the security of communication networks are vital to ensure society capitalises on the gains from 
increased connectivity. Firstly, our research shows that informational privacy is crucial to protect 
AV users against the misuse of data that can exacerbate existing social inequalities. Secondly, 
informational privacy is important to build consumer trust, which is required if further 
developments and improvements are to be made for AVs’ longer-run success. Thirdly, AV privacy 
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is important to guard against widespread surveillance, as the latter can potentially undermine 
democratic processes and discourage citizens’ active usage of connected platforms, which in turn 
can be detrimental to social equity and impedes the development of a smart city. 
Most of the surveyed governments have responded to privacy risks in general by enacting new 
legislation that applies to all personal data. The US SPY Car Act represents an attempt to monitor or 
manage the agencies in control of the information collected in vehicles, such as restricting data 
usage for advertising or marketing purposes. However, the Act has yet to introduce similar 
restrictions on data usage by insurance companies to determine insurance premiums, which have 
significant economic and social implications. The EU has explored privacy and cybersecurity risks 
to all cyber systems in general much earlier and its GDPR appears more restrictive relative to other 
countries in breadth and depth, prohibiting any automated decision that compromises its citizens’ 
privacy. It has been suggested that greater data sharing in Europe is impeded by the perception that 
European markets are “purely domestic” and that data sharing undermines Europe’s competitive 
advantage [142]. While proper implementation of the GDPR can ensure privacy protection, it is 
essential also to monitor the developments in other countries that face fewer data restrictions. The 
UK’s recommendations for privacy are similar to the provisions of the EU GDPR but are less 
specific in defining the ways in which data collection and usage is permitted. The French 
government acknowledges privacy concerns but is aware of the importance of greater data sharing 
for the development of AVs and AI in general, which the French government aims to further 
enhance to “rival” that in the US and China [142]. In particular, data privacy is much less of a 
concern in China compared to the EU and US, which be advantageous as there are fewer 
impediments to the storage, collection and use of data [142,143]. The Singapore government is 
amidst updating its privacy laws to further clarify exemptions to such restrictions to balance 
privacy needs with the public benefits that arise from using personal data. On the other hand, states 
in the US have generally enacted or introduced regulation to manage privacy risks specific to AVs. 
Voluntary guidelines on privacy best practices were released by Germany and Australia but in the 
case of Germany act as a temporary measure before privacy concerns are incorporated into 
legislation in future. 
The cybersecurity of AVs is another key factor for sustainable development in cities. With the 
proliferation of ICTs and society’s increasing dependence on connected platforms, such as AVs, the 
security of both the information being stored on such platforms and the individuals to whom the 
information relates is crucial for both social stability and economic sustainability. Our research 
shows that AVs are especially vulnerable to cyber-attacks due to their ability to store highly 
sensitive data and transmit such data on external communication networks. These networks can be 
hacked in a multitude of ways for committing crimes or undermining the safety of the AV, which 
has tremendous impacts on road safety and social stability. Insufficient cybersecurity of AVs can 
also expose a nation’s critical infrastructure to cyber threats that can disrupt the delivery of critical 
services and have a detrimental impact on the entire society’s wellbeing. Sufficient market uptake 
of AVs is required for further improvements to be made to the technology to realise the full scope 
of its economic, social, and environmental benefits. As such, cybersecurity of AVs is crucial to build 
trust in and increase public acceptance of AVs, which in turn can help increase its rate of adoption. 
The responses of governments to address cybersecurity risks appear more varied. Some 
governments have enacted or amended legislation that applies to all cyber systems, such as in 
China and Singapore. China’s new law emphasises on strengthening the security of critical 
infrastructure and networks, whereas Singapore’s amendments to its cybersecurity laws appear 
more targeted at strengthening the public’s response to data breaches. It has been noted that the 
presence of multiple regulatory agencies in China to oversee the implementation of these rules may 
complicate the initial stages of enforcement [144]. In comparison to the steps taken by other 
countries to address cybersecurity risks, China’s new cybersecurity law places a large emphasis on 
the protection of national sovereignty by, for instance, requiring all sensitive data to remain within 
China. This may negatively impact foreign AV manufacturers looking to test AVs in China, as it is 
likely that foreign AV developers are not permitted to “engage in mapmaking and comprehensive 
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data collection on Chinese soil” [143]. Nevertheless, the Chinese government is “clearly committed 
to helping Chinese companies lead the world” AV technology as it has identified AVs as one of its 
key priorities in its “Made in China 2025” initiative to lead the world in innovation. Its commitment 
is demonstrated in its official policies, which encourage Chinese technology companies to cooperate 
in devising transportation solutions including AVs [143]. State governments in the US have enacted 
legislation to address cybersecurity risks in specifically AVs, such as California’s regulations and 
Massachusetts’ new law that directs authorities to regulate personal data collected in all IoT 
devices. At the national level, the US government’s SPY Car Act address cybersecurity risks in all 
vehicles via requirements to ensure the robustness of vehicles and their networks against 
cyber-attacks. Some governments have pursued diversified approaches to manage cybersecurity 
risks. For instance, Singapore has amended existing legislation but has also issued public 
consultations for future regulatory changes, the EU has enacted the NIS directive while also 
releasing voluntary cybersecurity guidelines, and the UK has rolled out a national cybersecurity 
strategy, which includes investing in nation’s cybersecurity industry and strengthening its citizens’ 
cybersecurity skills. Some governments have mainly focused on conducting research on AV 
cybersecurity risks, such as that of Germany, France, and Australia, while Japan and South Korea 
have yet to indicate their approach to address cybersecurity threats. 
This study serves to inform policy-makers, scholars, and various stakeholders in the 
automotive industry of privacy and cybersecurity challenges of AVs for achieving smart and 
sustainable cities and highlighted in-depth the emerging strategies to address these concerns by 
different governments. It should be noted that in our study we examined the relation between AVs 
and smart and sustainable development and highlighted the existing steps taken to address privacy 
and cybersecurity risks in AVs. A myriad of factors affect how each government addresses different 
types of risks, and these strategies change over time. As such, a comprehensive analysis of each 
country is required in future to sufficiently justify the reasons behind governments’ strategies to 
privacy and cybersecurity concerns and changes to these strategies over time. The authors plan to 
use single and comparative case studies in future to address this question appropriately and hope 
that this study encourages other researchers to study the implications of AVs for smart and 
sustainable development. 
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